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Abstract 
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poor communities in the global south. Our main contention is that the extant BoP literature has a 
naïve view of what working with the poor really involves, which grossly underestimates adverse 
power relationships and disregards the hierarchies between the poor and outsiders who administer 
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partnership dynamics, we draw on extensive knowledge from the field of development studies, 
which has accumulated key insights about working in and with poorer communities over several 
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1. Introduction 
Can transnational corporations (TNCs) help improve the living conditions of the world's 4 billion 
poor to the extent that the global poverty problem would be eradicated by 2015? If it were up to 
leading American business school scholars writing about the Base of the Pyramid (BoP), the answer 
to this question would be an unequivocal ‘yes’, in spite of decades’ worth of controversial experience 
with the role of private business in development (Newell and Frynas, 2007). The flurry of recent 
BoP writings exudes an optimism about ‘the development project’ not witnessed since the large-
scale development efforts driven by governments, international organisations and NGOs 
immediately after WWII.  
The euphoria of the early postcolonial period has long since evaporated due to the lack of 
widespread achievements, and was supplanted by a lengthy period of disillusionment dominated by 
the Washington Consensus-based doctrine of unquestioned belief in narrow market-based solutions 
to poverty. During that period, many of the world’s poor experienced development in reverse. 
Hence, towards the end of the 1990s voices calling for a kinder, more socially inclusive and 
environmentally responsible capitalism became ever louder. The BoP proposition is a product of 
this period, riding onto an emerging global wave of popular concern about the future of our planet 
and the fate of the world’s vulnerable poor in the 21st century global capitalist system.  
Meanwhile, these rising sentiments in the development arena blended remarkably well with the 
world’s large transnational corporations’ efforts to look for solutions to structural market saturation 
and slow growth in their established home markets. The unexplored BoP, with its vast numbers of 
people, was presented as the last global business frontier, brimming with latent business investment 
opportunities and consumption potential. All that remained to be done was to unleash these forces 
for a ‘win-win’ outcome (Prahalad, 2004).  
But can the BoP proposition really deliver? So far, however, the corporate BoP idea is essentially 
unproven, despite leading BoP proponents now claiming to be well on the way to having identified 
the key processes and principles to success, and that it is just a matter of time before widespread 
tangible results will come about (e.g., Simanis and Hart, 2008). However, there are also a growing 
number of concerned scholars who have questioned key assumptions underlying the predicted ‘win-
win’ outcomes, and raised sincere doubts about the viability and desirability of the world's leading 
corporations assuming the lead role in anti-poverty strategies. 
This article is positioned within this growing body of critical literature. The specific focus of our 
critique is the casual manner in which the leading BoP proponents have treated two issues: 
heterogeneity among the poor, and the intricacies of participatory partnerships between TNCs, the 
non-profit sector (NGOs) and local poor communities in the global south. Our main contention is 
that the extant BoP literature has a naïve view of working with the poor, which grossly 
underestimates the adverse power relationships and disregards the hierarchies between the poor and 
outsiders who administer development interventions. To unpack the hidden complexities associated 
with heterogeneity and participation dynamics, we draw on extensive knowledge from the field of 
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development studies, which has accumulated key insights about working in and with poor 
communities over several decades.  
In section 2, we set the scene by briefly summarizing the motivations by TNCs for harnessing the 
market potential at the BoP, which gave rise to the emergence of the original BoP proposition 
(termed BOP 1). The essential features of BoP 1 are briefly sketched out in section 3. BoP 1 
emphasized the poor in their role as latent consumers. Hence, unlocking the poor’s consumptive 
potential is considered sufficient to raise their living standards as well as yield profits for TNCs. In 
response to extensive criticism of the product-delivery driven top-down BoP 1 perspective, the BoP 
discourse has recently evolved a more participative BOP 2 model, which we discuss in section 4. 
BoP 2 aims at raising the poor’s earning capacity along with increased consumption through the co-
creation of innovative business models by the TNC, the poor and other local actors in specific 
communities. At this point we encounter the BoP 2’s under-appreciation of the complexities of the 
partnership and participation processes. Section 5 is an in-depth discussion of participation and 
partnership intricacies in development based on key insights from development studies, and 
illustrated with examples from the Indian rural scene. It is divided into three parts, each of which 
highlights a different sub-field within which these complexities are played out: heterogeneity within 
local communities; interactions between local poor communities and outsider-interveners; and issues 
arising from the embeddedness of poor communities in broader national and global spheres of 
economics and politics. In section 6 we provide some conclusions.  
 
2. Motivations of TNCs for harnessing BoP markets 
The BoP literature has highlighted a number of drivers for TNCs to become engaged with the 
world's poorest of the poor. The motives encompass hardcore business arguments, corporate social 
responsibility and broad developmental justifications. Although the BoP proponents consistently 
emphasize the potential "win-win" nature of the strategies they advocate, significant tensions may in 
fact emerge when simultaneously trying to achieve these diverse goals. In practice, therefore, BoP 
projects are more likely to experience the need for a delicate balancing act between their search for 
private profits and their social concerns for the world's poor. This can easily go wrong one way or 
another. Since the sources of the tensions bear on the subject matter of this paper, we explore the 
various BoP arguments in this section as a precursor to our discussion about heterogeneity and 
participation problems at the BoP, as identified by development scholars over the last two decades. 
The discourse about the BoP as a business case spans a mix of threats and new opportunities. 
The threats are real and big. Future long-term market growth in developed-country markets is likely 
to be slow. Widespread market saturation, combined with the entry of new low-cost competitors 
from emerging economies who are making steady inroads into western markets (e.g. Athreye and 
Kapur 2009; Duysters et al. 2009; The Economist 2007a and 2007b), result in ever keener 
competition and structural overcrowding. These established markets no longer yield sufficiently 
lucrative financial prospects for large corporate investors (Hart and Christensen 2002; London 2007; 
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Prahalad and Hammond 2002). This increasingly uncomfortable situation is making it imperative for 
firms to explore unconventional markets in order to generate new future revenue streams (London 
and Hart 2004).  
The last large unexplored global market 'frontier' is the BoP, which is perceived to represent vast 
untapped business opportunities (e.g. Wilson and Wilson 2006). Prahalad has argued that the 
opportunity lies in the fact that many of the world's poor are in fact 'underserved' due to all kinds of 
market imperfections. For instance, the prices they pay for basic goods and services such as water, 
health services or credit may be higher than what wealthier income groups pay for equivalent (or 
even better quality) items due to local monopolies, unequal power relationships, inadequate market 
information, and so on (Prahalad 2004; Prahalad and Hammond 2002). The poor are also said to be 
neglected by the existing private sector due to the widespread erroneous belief that there is no profit 
to be made by serving this segment of the population. In this view, therefore, the population at the 
BoP has a lot of unmet needs as well as latent purchasing power, which represent potentially large 
business revenue possibilities by dint of the vast numbers of people living there (London 2007). 
Large TNCs with their deep financial pockets, vast technical resources and managerial experience 
required for developing and serving large markets, would be particularly well placed to create useful 
products and services for the vast BoP segment of the world's population, and to do so profitably. 
Moreover, since these markets are in the earliest stages, it is envisaged that revenue growth at the 
BoP can be extremely rapid (Prahalad and Hammond 2002). Some firms therefore instigate 
investments in BoP projects not because of any substantial current profit opportunities, but rather 
because they want to obtain future first-mover advantages in emerging markets (Hopkins 2007). By 
developing and adapting products for local markets firms can build brand recognition and they can 
accumulate knowledge about potential clients. This can lead to competitive advantage in a later stage 
(Sanders 2006; Capell and Lakshman 2008).  
Some have taken the business case even one step further, arguing that going down the BoP route 
is not merely about tapping vast unexplored business opportunities at the BoP for its own sake, but 
also about how the engagement with the BoP can ultimately help TNCs to beat their most powerful 
competitors on their home turf. Authors like Christensen emphasize that TNCs have no choice but 
to turn to the world's poor in order to develop new capabilities for "disruptive innovation": the 
incubation and commercialisation of revolutionary new products and services that combine very low 
price with good value. It is argued that such capabilities can only be developed successfully by being 
exposed to BoP markets, where these product characteristics are ruthlessly pursued by potential 
customers. The experience gained there would ultimately serve as a springboard for western TNCs 
to recapture market share in their traditional markets with revolutionary superior products 
(Christensen and Raynor 2003; Seelos and Mair 2005; Hart and Christensen 2002; Hagel and Brown 
2005).  
However, the BoP movement aims to be much more than a self-interested business strategy to 
survive and thrive in an increasingly globalised world. It also lays claim to being a viable approach 
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for sustainable development that can deal with the world's intractable poverty problem. Prahalad 
(2004) even goes as far as to claim that the BoP approach can eradicate the world's poverty problem 
by 2020. Coincidentally or not, the argument that BoP business strategies aimed at developing and 
selling products and services designed for the poor would have the potential of lifting billions of 
people out of poverty tallies well with the latest developmental strategies advocated by leading 
international development institutions that have been leaning heavily towards a substantial role for 
the private sector for meeting Millennium Development Goals since the late 1990s. Publications 
such as Unleashing Entrepreneurship, Making Business Work for the Poor (UN Commission on the Private 
Sector and Development 2004) and Creating Value for all: Strategies for Doing Business with the Poor 
(UNDP 2008) all convey the basic idea that many areas that have been traditionally served by 
governments and non-profits could benefit from the application of commercial business principles 
and market-creation approaches used by private business, and in this way deliver the coveted 
financial sustainability that often has been sorely lacking in earlier development approaches. Indeed, 
we are witnessing a historic alignment of interests, ways of thinking and strategic approaches 
between two communities that have led separate lives for decades (Lodge and Wilson 2006). This 
process of unlikely convergence – although riddled with hurdles – has set the stage for dialogue and 
attempts to forge partnerships between traditional non-commercial development institutions and 
private sector parties, including large western TNCs, with the stated aim of bringing about 
widespread and sustainable pro-poor development (London 2007; Simanis and Hart 2009).  
Of course, there are also additional, less emphasized, aims behind corporate BoP strategies, 
which can benefit from emphasizing the noble anti-poverty agenda. It is worth pointing out that 
there are several examples where private corporations have received funds from public and 
international developmental institutions to help them to get started with the implementation of BoP 
programmes.  
More enlightened forms of corporate self-interest can also be served in this way. For instance, as 
argued by London (2007) and Lodge and Wilson (2006), the shrinkage of our world into a global 
village has spread our consciousness about the vast gap between rich and poor and the alarming rate 
at which our environment is being destroyed. Since the global operations of powerful large 
corporations are widely perceived to be the primary drivers behind these problems, TNCs have 
come under considerable scrutiny and pressure to pursue a socially more inclusive and 
environmentally responsible type of capitalism, whether for moral reasons or to abate menaces of 
large-scale economic international migration, international terrorism and climate change (Ibid.: 118). 
The recent broad interest in Social Corporate Responsibility and the lively debate about what SCR 
schemes aimed at the BoP can and cannot deliver, also testifies to this trend (Blowfield 2005; 
Hopkins 2007). So, too, does the recent emergence of various kinds of experimental 'social 
entrepreneurship' models that attempt to pursue broader social and environmental aims alongside 
observing their financial bottom line and managing short-term shareholder interests. Some more 
perceptive corporate strategy writers have in fact pointed out that the value to corporations of 
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pursuing sustainable BoP-focused strategies lies not merely in helping the poor through pursuing 
profits at the BoP, but also in the unique opportunity that this strategy could afford for re-
invigorating their eroded legitimacy in their home markets (Lodge and Wilson 2006; Sanders 2006). 
They even see this as the ultimate reason why TNCs should get involved in anti-poverty activities. 
Lack of legitimacy breeds distrust in the firms' stakeholders and in society at large, and no firm can 
flourish without trust in the long term. 
Judging by the virtual absence of internal discussion on the subject in the BoP literature, BoP 
proponents (e.g. Simanis and Hart 2008; Simanis et al. 2008) do not perceive the simultaneous 
pursuit of all these disparate objectives as presenting a potentially problematic tall order, or at least 
they do not want to portray it as such. They make it appear as if win-win outcomes will come about 
almost as a matter of course after firms take the plunge. Achieving success at the BoP is essentially 
presented as a matter of ironing out teething problems and learning the relevant routines. To be 
sure, this will take some exploration, patience and effort, but all will be well in due course. As we will 
argue in this paper, this rosy view of things grossly underestimates the problems encountered by 
TNCs as they try to engender BoP-relevant, profitable, and innovative environmentally sustainable 
products  and business models in BoP settings, that can then also be successfully scaled or replicated 
widely so as to achieve the anti-poverty impact and profit that is expected from them.  
 
3. BoP1 
Since the publication of two articles (Prahalad and Hart 2002 and Prahalad and Hammond 2002), 
followed by Prahalad's (2004) book, the BoP concept rapidly gained common currency in business 
and development circles. In its original interpretation the BoP is an income-based definition, 
referring to the approximately four billion people who have an annual purchasing power (in PPP 
terms) of less than $ 1500. But since people with annual incomes of around $1500 are still worlds 
apart from the very poor, a somewhat more restricted definition of 1-2$ per day PPP also came to 
be widely adopted in due course (e.g. London 2007). Later BoP literature has also taken more 
explicit cognizance of the fact that poverty is a complex multidimensional phenomenon that cannot 
be adequately defined by an income-based measure alone (e.g. London 2007).  
We have seen that the BoP approach is premised on the important assumption that the 
combined pursuit of corporate profits and widespread poverty eradication is possible because (1) 
there is believed to be much latent collective purchasing power at the BoP; and (2) private 
corporations can allegedly raise the prosperity of the poor by selling them products and services. 
The early BoP literature (up to around 2005, henceforth called BoP1) put a lot of emphasis on the 
first point. In order for companies to succeed at the BoP, it is crucial that the poor's latent 
purchasing power be mobilised, in other words that the BoP be turned into a consumer market. The 
big challenge for corporations is thus to mobilize the BoP's capacity to consume. This is to be done 
by working on three aspects that are conducive to turning the poor into consumers: affordability, 
access, and availability (Prahalad 2004). Examples of schemes that have tried to do this include 
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single-serving packaging of basic consumption goods such as laundry soap and tea (increasing 
affordability through cash flow-smoothing), observing late opening hours (to facilitate access to 
poor people who cannot afford to pre-date or postpone their buying decisions), and to set up 
franchise-style rural distribution channels for modern consumer products like shampoos and body 
lotions (to increase availability and choice in remote areas). Sometimes, new markets have also been 
created, as in the case of nutritious low-cost ice creams (Prahalad 2004).  
This BoP1 approach is largely top-down and places heavy emphasis on deriving profits from 
selling to the poor (e.g. Sprague 2008: 89). It has come in for heavy criticism on a number of counts, 
which already have been elaborated elsewhere and need not be repeated here at any length (see e.g. 
Landrum 2007, for a good overview). Only the points that are most salient for the purpose of this 
paper need a brief mention here.  
The lack of empirical support for the BoP win-win proposition is worrying. First there is the fact 
that several case studies that have been flouted as BoP schemes fail to meet one or more BoP 
criteria. Several are not operated by western corporations (such as the Indian Jaipur Foot project and 
the Aravind Eye Care Project (Karnani 2007), and the efforts by the Haier Group to create rural 
markets among less-well off people in China (Anderson and Billou, 2007).  In fact there is increasing 
evidence of Southern-led creative entrepreneurial initiatives that are successfully serving the BoP, 
even in the difficult context of Sub-Saharan Africa (Hamann et al. 2008; UNDP 2008). This is giving 
rise to critical observations that TNCs have no particular advantages in serving this complex market, 
and that local entrepreneurship should be facilitated instead.  
Other case studies that are indeed operated by TNCs upon closer inspection were found to aim 
at above-BoP markets, for instance Philips India's rural health project DISHA that aimed for people 
with incomes between $1000-$2000 per annum (Kasturi Rangan et al. 2007), and the Mexican 
Cemex-operated Patrimonio Hoy programme, whose repayment requirements by participants work 
out to about $1.3 per day – an unaffordable proposition for those below the poverty line (Jenkins 
2005; Karnani 2006).  
More seriously, the BoP critiques bring out that schemes that do qualify as BoP projects proper 
appear to be questionable in terms of their performance either on the profit-side of things, or on 
their anti-poverty impact, with the overall result that these schemes, too, fail to provide support for 
the BoP win-win proposition. Zooming in on the profit prospects of Prahalad's (2004) case studies, 
Karnani's (2007) analysis is highly sceptical about the possibilities for TNCs to exploit economies of 
scale, given the difficulties and high transaction costs of operating in environments without 
developed infrastructure and modern institutions, and the low margin on each small BoP 
transaction. He concludes that "virtually none of the examples cited by the BoP proposition support 
the recommendation that companies can make a fortune by selling to the BoP" (Karnani 2007: 6). 
More sympathetic authors frame the profitability issue in terms of major challenges that are yet to be 
confronted: "Companies are under inevitable pressure to bring their BoP ventures to scale. In many 
such ventures, the true profit driver lies in volume rather than in profit margin. However, because of 
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challenges of ill-equipped organizational [corporate] cultures and the serious institutional and 
infrastructural deficits that characterise the BoP environment, few BoP ventures can be expected to 
reach scale at the pace seen in their mainstream counterparts" (Kasturi Rangan et al. 2007: 8).1  
Meanwhile, analysts looking at the BoP proposition from the poverty-alleviation perspective have 
taken issue with the notion that corporations would actually be able to raise people's living standards 
by selling to the BoP (e.g. Bendell 2005; Jaiswal 2007; Jenkins 2005; Jose 2006; Karnani 2007; Walsh 
et al. 2005; Zachary 2005). The fact is that the BoP1 proposition has indeed performed poorly in its 
treatment of the poverty-eradication implications of its advocated strategies. An analysis of the 
mechanisms through which BoP strategies are supposed to impact on socio-economic development 
is completely missing in the early BoP literature (Walsch et al. 2005). Perhaps we are justified in 
concluding from this that there are really no poverty eradication implications worth mentioning. 
The empirical evidence on this count is certainly not promising. Some critics have taken 
particular exception to the idea of the single serving sachets, which often create new environmental 
problems and are no cheaper than equivalent goods in larger packages. Corporations using 
sophisticated marketing tactics can also deceive poor people into believing that they are better off by 
using glamorous modern products such as branded lotions and skin creams that are in fact 
expensive substitutes for their earlier-used traditional products prepared and supplied by local 
businesspeople. For example, in the case of the widely hyped Hindustan Unilever's BoP project 
Shakti, "the challenge was to change long entrenched behaviours and shift consumers from 
commodities to brands. For the HL shampoo brand Clinic Plus, the challenge was to create 
dissonance among users of mud, natural herbs, and low-cost local shampoos" (Sinha et al. 2007, in: 
Kasturi Rangan et al. 2007). This smacks of exploitation and manipulation of ill-informed people, 
which is ethically problematic (Karnani 2007). Even more problematic is the fact that some of these 
schemes were co-funded by public bodies (Seelos and Mair 2006). The Shakti project was co-funded 
by the World Health Organisation to promote good hygiene practices and which promoted its own 
brands alongside this. Interestingly, the project was no great success from the business point of 
view, either. High turnover by the recruited sales ladies who found their hard work insufficiently 
rewarding financially has plagued the programme from its inception (Simanis et al. 2008). 
But the basic issue at stake goes even beyond this. Even if these types of excesses can be avoided 
(which is hard), can poor people increase their quality of life through an improved access to a wide 
range of cheap, good, high-quality products and services to such an extent that this will pull them 
out of chronic poverty? There is essentially no evidence to support this notion. As one critic 
                                                 
1 These observations are backed up by a host of business strategy papers that have examined the potential minefields likely to be 
encountered by western corporations entering emerging markets, even when they do not have a BoP focus. A review of that literature 
brings out the crucial importance of understanding the institutional context, and that some of the research also points to the business-
unfriendly behaviour of government and the influence of social networks and culture. Particular questions are raised about the 
desirability and the feasibility of introducing or even imposing American-style approaches in these contexts (Hoskisson et al. 2000: 
263). A later review warns that the evidence points to many multinational companies having fared poorly in developing countries 
because of all kinds of modern institutional voids, and companies'  inability to grasp how they could work around these (Khanna et al. 
2005).   
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remarked, ".. it is perfectly possible to use the market to extend access to useful goods and services 
... [but] few of these efforts have any substantial, long-term, broad-based impact on social 
transformation. ... The reason is pretty obvious: systemic change involves social movements, politics 
and the state, which these experiments generally ignore" (Edwards 2008: 37). For instance, in the 
case of HLL's Shakti, a field study found no evidence that the project empowers women or 
promotes community action (Tandon and Thekkudan 2007, as cited in Edwards 2008: 41).  
Another issue that has been widely pointed out is that developmental impact cannot be expected 
without enabling the poor to increase their productive capacity and earning power, rather than 
focusing on turning them into consumers of TNC-made products whose value for their enhanced 
well-being is in any case open to dispute (Karnani 2007; Jaiswal 2007; Zachary 2005; Hopkins 2007, 
Kasturi Rangan et al. 2007). Poverty can be addressed only when attempts to raise consumption are 
brought together with efforts to boost local production and local income generation. Moreover, the 
consumption aspect should focus on the things that the poor really need, such as basic shelter, food, 
water, clothing and energy (Khosla 2007). 
In conclusion, the high promises raised by the BOP1 approach have been shown to be based on 
some heroic assumptions. The basic point is that there seems to be no latent fortune at the BoP 
which is just waiting to be tapped by foreign corporations rolling into this vast "market" with 
revolutionary products and services that will be readily embraced by large numbers of poor, let alone 
that a BoP strategy also could have the effect of inducing widespread poverty eradication.  
In the light of these critiques and the emerging lack of clear win-win scenario's in early top-down 
BoP experiments such as the Philips health care and stove projects in India, Nike's World Shoe 
project in China (Simanis et al. 2008), the BoP movement has tried to move forward in order to 
improve effectiveness as well as to salvage its dented public image. As reflected in the later BoP 
literature (henceforth called BoP2), BoP discourse and practices began to shift away from the 
traditional linear innovation approach implied by its top-down sales-focused business concept, 
towards approaches that require active engagement with the poor. These are inspired by insights 
from community development and participation studies that take a much more organic view of 
innovation as societally-constructed learning and capacity-building processes that must be driven by 
local needs in order to be successful. The lack of attention to local needs as felt and experienced by the 
poor had been flagged by critics as a crucial factor behind the lack of impact (Khosla 2007; 
Kandachar and Halme 2007)  Put briefly, BoP practitioners are turning towards more bottom-up 
methodologies of local co-creation of innovative solutions to poverty problems through interactive 
learning in close dialogue and partnership with the poor and other stakeholders. This is an 
interesting and potentially fruitful development, which however does raise a host of new issues of 
how to achieve effective participation and deal with heterogeneity within local BoP communities.  
Meanwhile the first big unsolved problem in BoP1, the requirement of achieving scale for 
profitability, has received remarkably little attention. This is so despite the fact that in the face of low 
feasible profit margins, the viability of the whole BoP approach stands or falls with the ability of 
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firms to engender business concepts that have the potential to be widely scalable sources of revenue. 
This fact has been pointed out not merely by critics but also by many BoP proponents themselves. 
Arguably, the issue of scalability has even grown in magnitude since BoP has moved on from 
BoP1 to BoP2. This is because the co-creation of locally relevant business solutions through the 
deep embedding of foreign TNCs into particular local scenes is intensely focused on producing 
locally appropriate innovations that blend well with local informal institutions, culture, economic 
ways of organising, and governance structures in those particular local informal environments where 
the BoP experiments take place.  
This approach may well be the best way in which to effect longer-term financial viability of local 
ventures. However, it remains to be seen whether these locally grown solutions –  or even the local 
learning processes underlying them – would have potential for broad upscaling or replication across 
different communities, localities, regions and countries. Early evidence about intra-country 
heterogeneity seems to suggest that this issues could become highly problematic (Ault and Spicer 
2008). In particular, serious doubts have been expressed about the feasibility of the BoP approach to 
the world's poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Rost and Ydren 2006). The analysis of these 
authors shows that the concept of one BoP is essentially a false one. There is not even a series of 
identifiable BoP segments that one can distinguish by income segment, and target accordingly. That 
leads to a new conundrum because the BoP's requirements for locally-targeted products often 
cannot be met with the sort of business models that TNCs are good at operating – those that rely on 
large resources with which one can reap economies of scale from producing large volumes of 
standardised goods, operating centralised warehousing facilities and utilising of modern distribution 
logistics (WEF 2009: 19-20).  
However, since it is not yet clear that the BoP2 approach can indeed yield socially desirable, 
profitable and developmentally relevant outcomes at the micro level, an in-depth discussion of these 
wider scaling issues in this paper is premature. Instead, we will focus on two salient issues that have 
to be confronted by first-time local BoP2 experiments: intra-group heterogeneity and pitfalls of 
participation at the local level. This is the arena where a company has to get down to the nuts and 
bolts of doing business in a particular new environment in which the specificities of the power plays, 
networks, allegiances, and feuds in a particular locality must be confronted. 
 
4. BOP 2 
The extent to which BoP has become popular among business strategists and management 
researchers in the spate of less than a decade is captured by some remarkable developments. Starting 
in 2004, the BoP movement evolved a best-practice manual called the BoP Protocol, which 
documents the principal BoP ideas and practices. Since 2004, the manual has already seen a major 
overhaul, as it evolved from the initial top-down model of selling-to-the-poor discussed in the 
previous section, to a model based on bottom-up business co-venturing (for this latest version 2.0 of 
the BoP Protocol see: Simanis and Hart 2008). In recent BoP literature the letter "B" in the 
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abbreviation was also re-baptised to "Base", to convey the positive idea of a platform or launchpad 
from which one can build upwards. It seems as if one wanted to get away from the derogatory 
"Bottom" to which corporations reach down to help the miserable poor who are stuck there. The 
complete elaboration of the Protocol version 2.0 is obviously still a work in progress, so it is too 
early to pass a definitive judgement on its merits and weaknesses. However, we can make some 
salient observations about its likely potential to fulfill its promises by studying its basic features, the 
ongoing articulation processes and the direction in which the BoP work is evolving.   
A good starting point for this is the article "Innovation from the Inside Out" by Simanis and 
Hart (2009) because it represents the latest thinking and moreover it represents a first attempt to 
cast the differences between the BoP 1 and BoP 2 models in terms of contrasting paradigms of 
corporate innovation strategy. The article also enfolds earlier contributions that advanced a number 
of insights that build up towards it (e.g. Hart 2007; London and Hart 2004; London 2007; Simanis et 
al. 2008; Hart and Sharma 2004).  
Simanis and Hart typify the BoP 1 model as the embodiment of the familiar  "Structural 
Innovation Paradigm" (SIP) aimed at fulfilling customer needs by delivering a product or service 
that is better, faster and cheaper than those of competitors. The aim is narrowly financial and short-
term: one should try to increase consumption-based value through a focus on latent needs and 
involving transactional engagement with stakeholders (2009: 79-80). The big problem with this 
reductionist model is that innovation processes and corporate growth have become increasingly 
disembedded from broader societal values and the natural environment: "Communities are framed 
as target markets. Ecological systems are treated as national resources that supply raw materials" and 
there is "an absence of shared commitment" with parties outside the company (2009: 79&82).  
 The basic problem that the initial BoP 1 schemes hit up against is that the SIP paradigm does 
not work well at the BoP. There is only one solution: companies must step out of the SIP, and re-
embed themselves, along with their stakeholders, into broader society and the natural environment, 
adopting an Embedded Innovation Paradigm (EIP). The EIP is not about satisfying latent consumer 
needs, but about fostering and nurturing local economic potential of communities. The values it 
creates do not lie in the field of utility maximization through increased material consumption, but in 
the sphere of intangible assets – gaining people's trust, helping to reshape their identities, and 
fostering a sense of belonging in local communities – that are a springboard for personal growth and 
creativity. Relationships with stakeholders are not arm's-length impersonal economic transactions, 
but durable and personal, aimed at transformation of thinking and behaviour through social 
engagement and building of mutual trust and confidence. Simanis and Hart use the term business 
intimacy for this. (83-84).   
In order to make a successful transformation from SIP to EIP, corporations must evolve 
radically new management and organisational routines: Innovation at the BoP must be a co-creation 
process based on extensive participation and partnership, involving deep dialogue, openness to 
experimentation and mutual learning, and aimed at building local capacity in order to create "new 
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communities". This would involve the creation of a complete new community ecology, in which the 
company becomes part of, and redefines the community's identity (Simanis et al. 2008: 66). In the 
Protocol version 2.0 we read that this involves representatives of TNCs actually staying in local BoP 
communities for some time to get to grips with local problems, pressing needs, mores and ways of 
doing things. BoP writers also emphasize that TNCs cannot embark on this kind of strategy alone. A 
host of parties such as local governmental agencies, NGOs, other types of civil-society organisations 
as well as 'fringe stakeholders' must be involved as co-creation partners. All these parties bring 
essential unique knowledge, skills, assets and experience to the table. The powerful local 
stakeholders among them can facilitate and mediate TNCs' entry into local BoP communities, while 
the poor, weak, isolated, non-legitimate, and even non-human 'fringe' must be involved because 
their perspectives are particularly crucial for incubating disruptive change (Hart and Sharma 2004). 
However, how these extremely diverse stakeholders must work together and increase welfare for 
everyone in the "new communities" remains to be spelled out. 
Furthermore, the co-created BoP solutions entail complete business models that involve and 
empower the poor as venture entrepreneurs and value producers, rather than just innovative new 
product offerings that push the poor into the role of passive consumers (WEF 2009: 9; London and 
Hart 2004: 363). The possibility of co-developing new technologies is not discarded as such, but it 
seems to have been recognised at least by the main BoP proponents that a product-driven 
'technological fix approach' is not the way to go.  
The emphasis on building intangible assets of local capacity, local project "ownership", shared 
commitment and cohesion remind one of models of participatory and community driven 
development. Indeed, the adoption of strategies based on EIP are inspired by these (notably, 
Chambers 1983), and also by ideas such as "development as freedom" (Sen 1999). BoP writers have 
been keen to stress that BoP 2 goes well beyond the older developmental Basic Needs paradigm, 
which did not have a private-for-profit orientation and was aimed at meeting basic material needs 
without honing people's broader capabilities for wealth creation and social transformation (Simanis 
et al. 2008).  
It can be concluded from the above that achieving extensive participation by a range of highly diverse 
stakeholders, then, is considered to be the ultimate key to success of the BoP 2 co-creation model in 
local communities, and to the successful replication of those successful business models in other 
communities through ongoing processes of re-embedding and adaptation to suit local conditions 
(this is called 'scaling out', see: Simanis and Hart 2008; WEF 2009), to the point where they will 
ultimately yield the coveted win-win outcomes.  
One of the most cited examples of this participatory process at the BoP is the Grameen Bank tie-
up with Telenor for spreading mobile telephony in rural Bangladesh. However, two BoP researchers 
who studied the case closely observed that this is probably the exception that confirms the rule: "Mr. 
Yunus was considered a person of impeccable integrity – probably an ideal partner in Bangladesh 
where it is still hard to find influential partners that are resistant to corruption. ... That kind of 
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credibility is a scarce asset and extremely valuable in a developing country." (Seelos and Mair 2006, 
p. 5).2  
A number of writers, ranging from business strategy analysts to development scholars have 
already expressed a number of misgivings on the practicability of the BoP 2 model. First of all, this 
is untrodden terrain for the driving parties (TNCs), so there is likely to be problems in establishing 
communication with parties such as NGOs and poor communities (Russell 2008). Goodwill on all 
sides for starting constructive dialogue and engagement might not be enough to solve that problem. 
As the president of Oxfam America pointedly noted in a keynote speech to a large BoP conference: 
"Oxfam is interested in NGO-corporate partnerships that address obstacles to development, 
empower stakeholders, and build corporate accountability. [But]... how do we find mutual interests 
in our core missions? Is that actually something that's possible? Second, how do we identify win-win 
outcomes that we can build upon? Is it possible for us to actually do a deal? And finally, how do we 
find systemic market-based solutions to fundamental social problems? Is that a pipe dream or is that 
something we might be able to pursue together?" (Kasturi Rangan et al. 2007: 9). These are 
fundamental questions.  
On the corporate side, pressures to generate profit from BoP projects within a reasonable time-
horizon are not to be underestimated. Global capitalist institutions are after all are geared to 
observing the financial bottom line à la SIP, and individual corporate business units cannot simply 
decide to step out of that treadmill (Raworth et al. 2008). Says Mark O'Connor, of Pfizer Global: 
"Operational units need to generate a return on investment in order to achieve buy-in, both 
internally within the management structure of a company, as well as, externally with its stockholders 
... The fact is that a loss, cost, or net-zero balance will simply not achieve [this]" (2009). But even if 
the financial issue is not an overriding constraint, TNCs often don't have the legitimacy to involve 
themselves more in development, and/or they simply don't have the expertise (Lodge and Wilson 
2006: 85) 
Expertise of managing participation processes involving heterogeneous parties in a foreign 
setting is indeed not something one can pick up quickly and easily. Experts warn that stakeholder 
engagement in developing countries is a can of worms. Language, culture, education and pluralistic 
values can all effect the process of negotiation and decision making (Blowfield and Frynas 2005: 
507). In fact, the very concept of "community identity" envisaged by BoP writers could turn out to 
be completely fallacious in the face of profound power inequalities, diverse caste or tribal allegiances, 
gender biases, and contradictory agendas that being pursued by local parties.  
                                                 
2 One can add to this that the Grameen partnership with Telenor does not illustrate the success of a typical BoP2 venture in the first 
place, as it was solely based on cross-collaboration between two institutions, Grameen Telecom (an NGO owned by Grameen) and 
Grameen Phone (a for-profit owned by the Norwegian firm Telenor) (Seelos and Mair 2006). Under this arrangement Telenor did not 
need to engage at all in direct collaboration with poor rural users of telecom services, because that task was managed by the local 
Grameen Telecom. Moreover, Telenor was heavily subsidised by international development banks and aid institutions to go into 
Bangladesh, so this project also fails to illustrate the viability of the for-profit model. 
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One gets the impression that the main BoP 2 proponents are unaware of any of these problems. 
In a recent BoP paper, participation issues are reduced to some flat observations about 'the ideal 
degree', which is conceived of as lying somewhere on a scale from 0% to 100%, in most cases 
probably somewhere close to 50% (London 2007: 27-28). However, in practice such metrics could 
mean anything, or nothing at all. Not surprisingly, then, that there is as yet very little evidence of 
successful multiparty BoP partnerships in developing countries (Russell 2008; Lodge and Wilson 
2006; Kleine and Unwin 2009).  
 
5. Participation and heterogeneity 
The BoP literature is consistent in its uncritical use of the terms ‘community’, ‘participation’ and ‘co-
creation’. Communities of the poor are romanticized as replete with entrepreneurial individuals 
ready to team up with a TNC and its local non-governmental partners. Benefits from such 
partnerships are then assumed to flow to a community as a whole and poverty is alleviated. 
Nowhere do we observe an appreciation of the complexity of processes and the multiplicity of 
actual practices that these terms, as part of official BoP policy (or protocol), are expected to 
generate. Communities of the poor are in general not homogeneous entities where all members are 
socio-economically equal to each other. These inequalities and asymmetric power relations have 
important consequences for peoples’ behaviour, in driving the practice of a business model,3 and the 
poor’s capacities to seize any economic opportunities offered by a BoP venture. Participation by the 
poor in BoP activities is then framed by, and embedded in, local and non-local power relations.  
Furthermore, just like communities are disembedded from their local political and cultural contexts 
in the BoP literature, they are disconnected from national/global politico-economic contexts with 
which they may possess strong material and ideological links (cf. Kasmir 1999). In other words, the 
‘new communities’ to be created according to the BoP protocol are supposed to develop a business 
model in isolation from any pressures from a global market and its politics. In the BoP discourse, 
the global market enters as a provider of opportunities for successful ventures generated in the new 
communities, but cannot have any adverse local impacts.  
Simanis and Hart (2009) discuss two cases as shining examples of responsible capitalism at the BOP: 
the Grameen Bank (GB) led micro-credit programmes in Bangladesh and the giant Mondragón 
Cooperative Complex (MCC) in Spain.4 Simanis and Hart adopt the dominant pro-GB discourse in 
academic and development agency circles, without consulting a substantial literature that is critical of 
the ‘micro-credit as poor women’s empowerment’ doctrine. Among others, this literature has raised 
the following critical questions: Which global (and national) politico-economic developments have 
facilitated the growth of micro-credit? Who has access to micro-credit among rural women? Who 
                                                 
3 According to a recent report on the BoP potential by WEF (2009: 9), a business model “encompasses both the product or service 
offering, as well as the operational and financial arrangements that go into generating returns from a particular activity.”  
4 Here we simply go along with Simanis and Hart in assuming that GB and MCC are indeed examples of global capitalism, but see 
Gibson-Graham (2003) for a criticism of, and an alternative to, such ‘capitalo-centric’ accounts. 
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uses the credit that the women receive? And what role do factors other than the social collateral of 
women’s groups play in Grameen bank achieving its 98% loan recovery rate?  
For instance, Ghosh (2006) argues that in many cases, destitute women are excluded from women’s 
savings groups because they are deemed to pose too high a risk for other group members. Similarly, 
Karim (2008) documents that rural middle class women benefited most from micro-credit. She 
compares micro-credit success to a lottery ticket: a few successful cases instill the promise of 
‘making a windfall’ in numerous others. Additionally, in a majority of the cases, micro-credit loans 
are eventually used by male members of a household: a fact acknowledged by Mohd. Yunus himself 
(Yunus and Jolis 1998, quoted in Karim 2008; Rahman 1999; Goetz and Sen gupta 1996).5 
Furthermore, social solidarity in tight-knit rural communities may not be the only reason behind 
high recovery rates at the GB: Ito (2003: 328) shows that coercive power of bank workers over the 
rural poor “strengthens the credit discipline of the borrower.” Even the borrowers’ groups may not 
be horizontally structured as is generally assumed but some group members may wield more power 
than others (see Rahman 1999). In addition, non-payment of a loan installment threatens a woman’s 
honour and shame in rural Bangladesh, and households try their best to pay on time often lending 
money from other sources for the installment (Rahman 1999; Karim 2008). Thus there is a high risk 
that poor households get trapped on a debt-treadmill, from which an escape can be very difficult 
while living and working in an uncertain economic environment that lacks state-provisioned safety 
nets. Driven by the global ideology of neoliberalism since the late 1970s, the “withdrawal of the state 
from welfarist policies” has substantially enlarged the space for organizations such as GB to become 
‘shadow states’ in providing human welfare and development (Karim 2008: 6). 
Simanis and Hart’s (2009) second shining example is that of the MCC in Basque country. Here again 
no classes or power relations are mentioned and the strength of Mondragón’s “vision of cooperative 
entrepreneurship” is uncritically rehearsed from the dominant discourse on MCC (ibid: 84). This 
MCC discourse was constructed by divorcing it from its political and economic contexts and by 
omitting its complexities and contradictions (Kasmir 1999). In an earlier study, Kasmir (1996) found 
that the cooperative workers are not more satisfied with their jobs than workers at a unionized 
private firm in a neighbouring town. MCC workers are allowed much less time to organize and come 
up with a shop-floor position than union delegates. Workers at MCC do not make use of the 
substantial participatory democracy avenues available to them because “they lack the expertise to 
fully evaluate engineers’ proposals and managers’ business plans or to develop alternatives.” (Kasmir 
1999: 387). Overall she argues that while workers’ accomplishments are central to the MCC 
discourse, the perspectives of the workers themselves are missing from the discourse. The latter is 
largely based on managerial perspectives, according to which no class conflict, no contestations, and 
no inequalities exist at MCC. This privileging of managerial perspectives must be situated within 
                                                 
5 According to official instructions, bank workers must monitor loan-use for productive purposes. In practice however, bank workers 
do not have the time or the incentives to monitor loan use that often serves the purpose of consumption smoothing for poor 
households (Ghosh 2006). Bank workers’ performance is judged on recovery rates and this is what they focus on (Rahman 1999; 
Karim 2008). 
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“global transformations of work, class relations and ideology” (Kasmir 1999: 394). For instance, to 
contain worker militancy across the United States and Europe, new programmes for labour 
participation in management were introduced in the 1970s. However, instead of addressing the 
demands of workers’ movements, these programmes were “management-initiated plans intended to 
increase productivity and profitability and to strengthen managerial control (Hogler and Grenier, 
1992).” (Kasmir 1999: 394). 
In the remainder of this section, using insights from development studies, we elaborate different 
issues identified in the two examples above. The section is divided into three parts. Part I looks at 
heterogeneity within rural communities (villages, or occupational groups such as farmers) and its 
consequences for the politics of participation in development projects/programmes. Part II is an 
exploration of hierarchies between external state/non-state actors and rural communities in 
participatory development. Part III discusses how rural communities are embroiled in wider political 
and economic developments: an illustration of how the global/national becomes local through its 
impacts on, as well as appropriation by, community members.  
5.1 Intra-community heterogeneity 
Communities may be defined as governable spaces at different geographical scales, “within different 
social force fields” (Watts 2005: 105). For instance, a nation may itself be viewed as an ‘imagined 
community’ which fosters a national identity within a given geographical space. In general, people 
may be part of multiple communities (imagined or otherwise) such as class, ethnicity, religion, caste, 
gender, same age-groups, constituency of a leader, and thus have multiple identities through these 
community affiliations (Watts 2005). These multiple affiliations may compete with each other and 
act as bases for heterogeneity if we isolate a single community at some spatial level. In other words, 
grouping people together in one community does not lead to a decimation of other identities and 
affiliations to other possible communities. These other identities are carried by people into a new 
community delineated for purposes of a development project. Our primary focus here is on a local 
community defined at the level of one village, or a small cluster of villages, or an urban 
neighbourhood.  
The nature of intra-village heterogeneity can take different forms in different parts of the developing 
world. In our discussion, we use developing Asia, particularly rural India, to illustrate our arguments. 
In the first instance, heterogeneity in a local community manifests itself as class or, in a rural area, 
landownership. Even in a village afflicted with poverty, there are rich and poor farmers who are 
assisted in their agricultural tasks by the landless. As an example, consider a small south Indian 
village of 212 households where one of us did fieldwork in 2005-6 (Arora 2009). The landownership 
structure of this village is shown in Table 5.1 (for other similar examples of unequal landownership 
in north and south Indian villages, see Jeffrey et al. 2008; Nair et al. 2007; Rawal 2001; Wadley 1994). 
This village is predominantly inhabited by the landless and smallholders with less than 2 hectares of 
land, but a handful of farmers own larger landholdings. Furthermore, as in the rest of India, 
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landownership in this multi-caste (and tribe) village is not independent of caste affiliation (see Table 
5.2). 
 
Table 5.1. Distribution of land holdings (owned) in a south Indian village 
 Number of Owners 
Number of farmers with ≤ 1 hectare 71 
More than 1 but ≤ 2 ha 50 
> 2 but ≤ 3 ha 7 
> 3 ≤ 4 ha 8 
> 4 ≤ 6 ha 2 
> 6 ≤ 8 ha 3 
Total number of farmers 141 
Number of landless households 61 
 
Table 5.2 Caste and land distribution in the village 
Caste Number of 
households 
Number of 
landowners 
Total land 
owned (ha) 
Average per 
household 
Standard 
deviation 
Koya 75 56 61.8 1.10 1.18 
Yadava 62 43 62 1.44 1.08 
Lambadi 29 13 21.4 1.65 1.09 
Mala  14 11 19 1.73 1.87 
Mudiraj 10 6 20.2 3.37 2.24 
Potter 7 5 5 1.00 0.57 
Goud 5 2 3.2 1.60 0.28 
Dudekula 4 3 2.4 0.80 0.57 
Choudhary 3 2 1.2 0.60 0.35 
Reddy 1 1 0 0.00  
Total 210 142 199.4 1.38  
 
Caste in India continues to be associated with unequal access to land (Singh 2008), but the forms of 
inequality sustained through the caste system are not restricted to landownership. There is by now 
considerable evidence that people from the lower castes (Scheduled Castes, SC, or Dalits) and tribes 
(Scheduled Tribes, ST) have lower living standards than non-SC/ST people (Deshpande 2000; 
Deshpande 2001; Dréze and Sen 2002; Kijima 2006). This relationship between caste and poverty is 
observed in urban and rural India. Affirmative action (reservations in educational institutions, 
government jobs and rural development programmes) by post-colonial Indian governments in the 
last six decades has had little impact on eradication of lower caste destitution (Kijima 2006). Kijima 
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found that in the same village, ST households earn lower returns on their investment than non-
SC/ST households. It is important to note here that state-sponsorred categories of SC and ST 
include a large diverse group of castes and tribes. One can observe substantial heterogeneity, in 
terms of living standards and landownership, even within a single caste or tribe group living in one 
village (see the standard deviation results in Table 5.2 for the dispersion/concentration of 
landholdings). In addition, some members of a caste group may afford better opportunities than 
others, as a result of possessing better social networks to influential patrons within a village and 
outside.6 Thus, there is no one-to-one correspondence between destitution and membership of a 
low caste or tribe.  
Heterogeneity among individual households (or heads of households) leads to a skewed power 
distribution within a community.7 This power has many faces. In the first instance, it is expressed 
through interpersonal relationships. Here, one of the members of a relationship (ego) controls the 
actions of the other (alter), such as in patron-client relationships. This form of power is “understood 
as the ability of an ego to impose its will on an alter, in social action, in interpersonal relations.” 
(Wolf 1990: 586). A second form of power is more pervasive and it implies the ability of an 
individual actor to control the settings within which others act and interact. A third form of power, 
which may be seen as an extension of the second, “organizes and orchestrates the settings 
themselves” or in Foucault’s words, it is the ability “to structure the possible field of action of 
others” (Wolf 1990: 586). The latter two forms of power have consequences for how control of, and 
benefits from, a project is distributed within a community. Exercise of these structural forms of 
power determines which voices are raised in public, or silenced, and whose knowledge and interests 
are paramount in participatory or community-driven development. Also power relations of 
community members with external actors can influence the practice and outcome of a project. We 
discuss this issue in section 5.2. 
In a survey of community-based and -driven development projects, Mansuri and Rao (2004) find 
that power relations between community elites and others can lead to an elite capture of decision-
making in, and benefits from, a project (also see Classen et al. 2008; Platteau 2004; Abraham and 
Platteau 2004). Examples of such projects have been observed in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
(see the cases reviewed by Mansuri and Rao 2004). The elites derive their power and their roles as 
leaders from local (and in some cases, non-local) institutions: they are often caste or tribal headmen, 
or other influential people in a community who are well-connected to political parties and 
development agencies from outside the village. Community influentials often act as brokers who 
connect development agencies to their target (poor) beneficiaries: many NGOs use these elites as 
entry points into a village and through this, further entrench their power in a community. The elites 
                                                 
6 This does not however imply that the density and effectiveness of individuals’ social networks cannot be affiliated with caste 
membership. For instance, people use their caste networks to find working-class as well as white-collar jobs (Munshi and Rosenzweig 
2006). In general, we believe it’s erroneous to view a caste group as a solidary community in which people help each other at the 
expense of members of other castes. 
7 In this paper, we do not address issues of intra-household power relations and how they constrain the agency of non-dominant 
members of a household. These very important issues are simply out of the scope of our present discussion. 
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then are also able to control the flow of information from external agencies into the community and 
vice versa. Community leaders can for example then convince development agencies into thinking 
that their private interests are the interests of the community as a whole, including those of the 
poorest members (Platteau 2004).8 In this way, the elites ‘produce’ local knowledge that excludes 
voices of non-dominant members of a community (including women) and makes a participatory 
project more suited to their own needs rather than those of the poor (Mosse 1995; Mosse 2001).  
Elite capture does not of course affect all community-led development projects. In some cases, 
‘benevolent’ elite control rather than ‘pernicious’ elite capture may be observed (see Dasgupta and 
Beard 2007; and Fritzen 2007 for evidence from Indonesia). In the benevolent scenario, the elites 
who dominate a project, yet distribute its benefits, may be downwardly accountable to members of 
their communities (Mansuri and Rao 2004). Such downward accountability is likely to avoid elite 
capture in provision of public goods (Wade 1988; cited in Mansuri and Rao). This situation may 
however be quite difficult to realize for privately appropriable profits, such as those promised by 
BoP ventures. 
Between the dichotomy of elite capture vs. elite control, one may observe cases where elites capture 
development resources for their own benefit and that of their extended kin and network of friends 
(see Jeffrey et al. 2008: 1381-82 for an example), while excluding the wider (more heterogeneous) 
community. In these cases, the elites are downwardly accountable only to their kin and friends. Such 
a form of elite capture and bounded redistribution may also be observed in pro-poor development 
projects in which the benefits on offer are not of direct interest to the comparatively well-off elites. 
Here, the elites work to siphon off the benefits to ‘their poor’ through patronage networks (Mosse 
1995). 
Finally, the authority of elites may be contested by non-dominant social groups, or individuals from 
competing factions, in a community. In such cases, a power sharing arrangement can arise between 
different social groups, each represented by their leader (Tanabe 2007 makes such a claim while 
tracing the village-level impact of the 73rd amendment to the Indian constitution which made multi-
caste village councils mandatory). However, emergence of a new power-sharing arrangement in a 
community due to a constitutional amendment or another development, exogenous or endogenous 
to the community, does not imply that difference and heterogeneity are replaced by equality and 
homogeneity. Poor and rich individuals, more and less powerful social groups, and cultural 
hierarchies such as those sustained by the caste system continue to exist (more on this in section 
5.3). Here, it is worth noting that developments external to a village can provide support to 
subaltern groups trying to wrestle respect and self-determination from dominant individuals and 
social groups. Although external interventions must be introduced gradually and cautiously into 
                                                 
8 In general, it should be recognized that “multiple constructions of knowledge” exist in any society, or a heterogeneous community, 
and that the interests of a poor farmer can diverge from those of a rich one (Thompson and Scoones 1994). And one has to go 
beyond Platteau’s emphasis on elites duping development agency personnel to explore how local needs and knowledge are interpreted 
by the latter, who may be more interested in projecting consensus and homogeneity in a community (instead of conflict or 
contestation) to realize time-bound development projects (Chhotray 2004). More on this in section 5.2. 
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communities as they “interact with already contested domains of power and meaning.” (Li 1996: 
515, quoted in Mosse 1997: 499). In general, communities are at least as much a space for 
contestation as for benevolence on part of its elites: “Communities typically contain both reactionary 
(despotic or disciplinary) and emancipatory (liberatory) expressions that are, as it were, in perpetual 
struggle with one another: communities are not always warm and fuzzy.” (Watts 2005: 105). These 
arguments are as likely to be applied to the ‘new communities’ envisioned by Simanis and Hart 
(2008; 2009), which arise after representatives from TNCs and local NGOs have embedded 
themselves in the ‘old communities’. 
5.2 Interactions between external actors and communities 
In recent BoP literature, interactions between external actors and communities are framed in terms 
of the development of a new business model which can eventually lead to a new product or service. 
The social space for the development of this business model is provided by the so-called new 
communities. There are two important unresolved issues here. First, the sale of the new product or 
service is supposed to bring profits into a new community. However, the way in which the financial 
arrangements of the business model coordinate distribution of profits among different members of 
the new community is not worked out in the BoP protocol or elsewhere in the literature (but see 
London 2007, who raises this issue in a cautionary reflection, and WEF 2009: 31-32). Will the TNCs 
retain a lion’s share of any profits generated from these ventures or will they be more equitably 
distributed? Will a kinder, more-inclusive, form of capitalism pursued by Hart and co-authors finally 
arrive at the poor’s doorstep? The answer will depend on whether the practice of the BoP activities 
are driven by the policy models and protocols devised by BoP proponents (TNCs and academics), 
or by the interplay of these external factors and existing local social hierarchies and routinized 
practices of partner organizations and community members. Recent work in development 
anthropology has shown that the latter interplay, rather than a policy model, drives the practice of 
participatory development projects (Rossi 2006; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2005; 2004; Cooke 
and Kothari 2001). 
Secondly, a new BoP project arrives into a rich social world with its own well-entrenched habits, 
practices, and values. BoP proponents want to change these old ways of people, replacing them with 
a “new way of thinking” which embraces the new “enterprise’s values.” (Simanis and Hart 2009: 83, 
on “Transformational Stakeholder Engagement.”). However, whether this embracement of new 
ways actually creates or destroys existing value for all or some members of a community is left out 
of the picture (but once again see London 2007). And value must be viewed broadly here, beyond 
the purview of financial profitability, to include capabilities, socio-economic equity, and self-respect. 
Furthermore, Simanis and Hart’s transformational stakeholder engagement is attempted within a 
broader (global/national) politico-economic context, which can enhance or constrain local value 
creation for a poor community. We consider two examples of this context in section 5.3. 
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Interpreting local needs 
We’ve already noted that external actors in a participatory, community-driven project – NGOs, 
firms, state, no matter how embedded – play an important role in interpreting local needs and 
knowledge in a community.9 This process works through a mixture of two ‘practices of 
interpretation’. First, community conditions (poverty, inequality, or in more specific projects, lack of 
sanitation infrastructure, health impacts of excessive pesticide use) are problematized as 
“deficiencies that need to be rectified.” (Li 2007: 7; also see Escobar 1995). Building on this, external 
agencies play an active role in framing local needs to ensure that their own agendas are reflected in 
what they read on the ground (Mosse 2001: 19-21). Actual needs of the poor are narrowed down, 
reinterpreted in terms of solutions, such as technical expertise or products, that the external agency 
can deliver.10 Furthermore, this practice of interpreting and constructing communities’ needs situates 
agency personnel as experts, who then expect behavioural changes from community members while 
making them amenable to expert direction (Mitchell 2002). 
However, we are not implying that an external agency simply forces its will on and coerces villagers 
into expressing their needs solely according to the agency’s preferences. A certain degree of 
collusion is necessary between dominant community members and the representatives of the 
external agency (Mosse 2001). Through such collusion, the views of non-dominant groups in a 
community are often excluded from the list of local needs generated through a participatory 
appraisal (Chhotray 2004; Mosse 1995). Accounting for conflicting or contested claims is never easy 
to accommodate in time-bound development projects (Chhotray 2004). Thus, a dominant group’s 
interests are legitimized and attributed to a whole community. This is the second practice of interpretation 
used by external agencies, which has the impact of negating local political relations within a 
community (Li 2007; Chhotray 2004).11 
Over time, the poor (beneficiaries, often including some non-elites in pro-poor projects) may 
understand what a project can provide, and thus gain some planning or policy knowledge about the 
development agency’s activities (Mosse 2005). They may then utilize this newly acquired planning 
knowledge to get the project to meet some of their idiosyncratic needs, often adapted from the set 
of benefits that the development agencies are able to deliver. In this way, the beneficiaries attempt to 
match the knowledge generated by the project about local needs with their own interests. 
                                                 
9 In the BOP 2.0 literature, a common assumption is that the involvement of grassroots NGOs will solve the problems of embedding 
a new venture into poor communities and facilitate participation. However, evidence on participatory projects initiated by NGOs 
collected by practitioners over the last three decades has shown that such projects are not immune “from the problems affecting 
larger, officially sponsorred aid programmes.” (Feeney 1998:7). These problems relate to ensuring the “participation of the poorest 
and equitable distribution” of project benefits (Feeney 1998: 151). See Feeney for an overview of NGO-led participatory projects on 
natural resource management supported by Oxfam, Great Britain. 
10 An apt example of this among BoP projects is the S.C. Johnson intervention in Kenya reported by Simanis and Hart (2008). In this 
project, the first need of the Kenyan slum community was interpreted to be hygiene and cleanliness for which chemicals already being 
manufactured by the S.C. Johnson corporation were adopted as solutions. 
11 At the same time, it must be noted a community’s elites whose needs or preferences are finally registered as legitimate may possess 
more skill and authority in presenting their personal interests as those of the community (Mosse 2001: 21). See section 5.1. 
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Interpreting local knowledge 
In participatory technology development, Chambers’ (1983) famous dictum of ‘putting the last first’ 
requires that knowledge circulate among external ‘experts’ and community members. In practice, 
however, it is difficult to achieve such two-way transfer of technical knowledge, due to the fact that 
community members’ knowledge is considered to be ‘traditional or indigenous knowledge’ (IK), 
different from the experts’ own scientific knowledge. Through this classification, the experts relegate 
peoples’ local knowledge, skills and experience to the realm of the non-scientific i.e., practical 
knowledge about concrete everyday life or relevant only in its local context; scattered; akin to 
common sense (lacking intellectual content and deductive logic); closed and non-systematic 
(Agrawal 1995). However, as Agrawal has demonstrated, there are no substantive, epistemological 
and contextual differences between scientific knowledge and IK. The differences instead are rather 
political: the politics of classifying knowledge into different categories, where the global (and 
national) asymmetries of wealth and authority are projected on to the knowledge arena, privileging 
modern science over IK (Agrawal 1995). Such knowledge hierarchies are unlikely to be bridged by 
forming a coalition, or a new community in the sense of the BoP protocol, to muster social and 
political support for participatory technology development (cf. Biggs and Smith 1998). 
This is true even in projects where IK is touted as something essential to harness for making 
development more effective in meeting the needs of the poor (Sillitoe 1998; Blaikie et al. 1997), 
ensuring environmental sustainability, and generally avoiding the pitfalls of top-down high-
modernist development so vividly documented by Scott (1998). However, proponents of IK fail to 
recognize that IK, like all knowledge, is produced and interpreted within a set of unequal power 
relations. In other words, honouring local practices and peoples’ knowledge is simply not going to 
succeed without remapping the cultural power structures in which these practices and knowledge are 
embedded (Gururani 2002). For instance, within the context of a participatory project, development 
workers are likely to discredit local practices and knowledge through their “superior models of 
knowing and rational decision making introduced by educated well-dressed outsiders, guided by 
foreign ‘participation experts’.” (Mosse 2005: 96).12  
However, as in the case of local needs, it may be erroneous to view the participatory knowledge 
dynamics, as described here, as solely top-down. Mosse (2005) argues that privileging such a top-
down imposition perspective obscures the agency of the poor in co-opting or complying with the 
‘official’ view of local knowledge and practices. For instance, by adopting modern techniques such 
as scientific agriculture, community members may successfully project themselves as rational agents 
worthy of the development benefits targeted at them (Mosse 2005). 
                                                 
12 Similarly, within a village, whose knowledge is considered valuable and who can act as an IK expert is a question of local power and 
authority relations. Just as with local needs, perspectives of the locally powerful are likely to dominate (Mosse 1994, cited in Gururani 
2002). More generally, new knowledge is socially constructed and reflects the unequal power relations in the locality where it is 
produced and circulated. In return, this socially-constructed knowledge serves to reinscribe local power relations. Furthermore, no 
knowledge can be bounded in a locality, nor can it be considered to be a uniform and immutable entity, as it always interacts with 
non-local discourses of relevant ‘scientific’ knowledge. See Gururani (2002) for an example of women’s knowledge of forest 
management in the Indian Himalayas. 
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In summary, we have discussed two sets of practices of interpretation and representation used by 
development workers in participatory development projects. According to the first, local needs and 
knowledge are framed in ways consistent with extant social hierarchies between development 
‘experts’ and poor communities. The second set of practices is often based on collusion between 
development workers and participating communities. These actors share a set of cultural codes 
which facilitate the communication of local needs and knowledge. Representation of local needs is 
then a dialogic process which occurs within a shared culture of development. But this shared culture, 
like any other, is made up of heterogeneous elements, and power and difference persist “between 
different ‘speakers’ within the same cultural circuit.” (Hall 1997: 11). Thus, cultural communication 
takes place within the context of heterogeneity and asymmetric power relations, allowing the 
representation of certain facts as authoritative while obscuring others. 
Now the question arises, how and why does the shared culture of development get constructed? 
Here it may be instructive to view development as an institution which rewards those actors who 
abide by its rules (Douglas 1987, cited in Rossi 2006). In this way, community members attempt to 
gain benefits from participatory projects by conforming to their role as ‘development beneficiaries’. 
Local development workers similarly interpret community needs and represent the practice of a 
project in terms of planned “policy narrative” of the project; and finally, the “planners align their 
arguments with dominant development paradigms to find support for their plans.” (Rossi 2006: 29). 
An alternate way to understand the shared culture of development is through Foucault’s (1991) 
concept of governmentality. Governmentality does not operate as forced coercion and extension of 
bureaucratic regulation, but through the “conduct of conduct”, or the regulation of people’s actions 
by configuring their aspirations to match the interests of the powerful. Here, power is viewed as 
something “productive rather than repressive” and is concerned with creating subjects who act as they 
ought to (Lewis and Mosse 2006: 3; Li 2007). Development then “operates by educating desires and 
configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs.” (Li 2007: 5).  
5.3 The community, severed from its context 
Isolating a community for purposes of targeting a development intervention, or social analysis, may 
create a neat governable and controllable social world (Cornwall and Brock 2005). However, as we 
discussed in sections 5.1 and 5.2, this governability of the local community is not achieved through 
forced imposition, but produced through practices of external as well as community actors, and by 
negotiating local power relations. In the present section, we argue that a community is typically 
connected to regional/global politico-economic contexts through material and ideological links. By 
positing a community as isolated, a discourse can preempt discussions about how global movements 
of corporate capital, commodities, and ideologies create new vulnerabilities in poor communities. 
The latter discussions have the power to ‘rupture the optimistic narrative’ of poverty alleviation and 
win-win situations (cf. Kasmir 1999: 394), as propagated in the BoP literature.   
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Beyond the discursive realm, global and national politico-economic contexts have a bearing on the 
practice of a project and its outcomes. As we show in the following, the global and the national are 
brought home in myriad ways by people in rural communities. For example, the context may be 
appropriated by subalterns to aid their struggle for respect and equality in a community. In 
opposition, the dominant big men in the community may employ parallel developments at the 
national or global level in their counter-resistance efforts. Thus, wider politico-economic 
developments, reflected in local contestations and struggles for survival, filter into everyday lives of 
the poor and cannot be easily overridden by new financial interests, such as those promised by a 
BoP venture.  
Continuing our focus on rural India, we briefly consider the impacts, and community-level 
endogenization, of two wider contextual developments of the last couple of decades. First, we 
discuss the widening sphere of interactions between caste-based identities and electoral politics, and 
their multiple manifestations at the village-level. Secondly, we bring in the global economic context 
in terms of agricultural markets and declining state support for agriculture in neo-liberal India. Small 
and marginal farmers attempt to secure their livelihoods within this context, while being exposed to 
newer vulnerabilities. Agriculture is facing an acute crisis, with about 49% of India’s farmers trapped 
in debt according to a 2003 survey (Mishra 2007a), and widespread farmer suicides being reported 
from different parts of the country. Finally, we also explore the politics of recent state-led solutions 
to the agrarian crisis. 
‘Modern’ electoral politics uses ‘traditional’ caste structures to stabilize itself, legitimizing the actions 
of its leaders and mobilizing the masses with the aid of caste identities and loyalties (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 1967; Béteille 1970; Kothari 1970; Kaviraj 1997). In turn caste, as an evolving institution, 
gets intimately modified through the influence of electoral politics, often through consolidation of 
caste identities and internal solidarity, regeneration of caste-based divides, and aggravation of inter-
caste conflicts. Although the bulk of this process visibly takes place at provincial and national levels, 
where we observe the increasing clout of lower caste political parties such as the pro-Dalit Bahujan 
Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh (Jaffrelot 2003), effects are also felt at local levels in villages (Jeffrey et 
al. 2008). People in villages often use their awareness of, and ties to, national and regional political 
(and/or religious) movements in their local struggles for greater recognition, dignity and power 
(Somjee 1973; Mines 2002). In fact, national and regional politics are integrated in everyday life 
within the village to such an extent that the non-local becomes the local. This is evident in the 
struggles for equality waged by Pallars (Dalits) in the Tamil village studied by Mines. In the first 
instance, this struggle took the form of the Pallars’ refusal to attend the temple festival headed by 
the dominant landowning castes of the village and in which the Dalits played a peripheral role (such 
boycotts of ritual events by Dalits in south India have also been noted by Dirks 1988 and Fuller 
1992, cited in Mines 2002: 68). Secondly, the struggle took an openly subversive stance through the 
organization of a Pallar temple festival in which the dominant villagers were exposed to the Pallar 
“vision of a different, egalitarian future.” (Mines 2002: 69). This assertion by the Pallars had several 
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features including “a bold procession route, displays of wealth and largess, taking over a road, and 
using portraits of Ambedkar, a national Untouchable hero and leader, to define an alternative, 
extravillage source of identity and power.” (Mines 2002: 69).  
In response to these lower-caste “assertions of identity” (Owens 2000: 704), the upper castes 
organize ‘counter-resistance’ to set the stage for inter-caste conflict and slow down a radical 
transformation of society toward greater equality (Jeffrey et al. 2008; Mines 2005). At the level of 
regional and national electoral politics, this trend is exemplified by the rise of the Hindu nationalist 
parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party and Shiv Sena in the 1980s and 90s, who support 
reinstatement of the caste system’s hierarchical order. At the local level, members of upper castes 
may exploit national level developments, such as the destruction of the Babri Mosque in December 
1992 and subsequent attempts to build a Hindu temple in its place by Hindu nationalists, for 
marginalizing the lower castes and Muslims (see Mines 2005: 201-208 for a telling example). In 
addition, many members of the upper castes are locally “well-equipped – economically, socially, and 
culturally – to counterresist lower-caste political assertion.” (Jeffrey et al. 2008: 1382). Upper caste 
tactics include economic exclusion of recalcitrant lower caste members who depend on them for 
agricultural employment; building more effective social networks with government bureaucracies; 
and development of ‘sophisticated’ identities through urban clothing and construction of new multi-
storied houses replete with modern goods such as televisions and refrigerators (Jeffrey et al. 2008). 
The new urbane identity has the impact of creating difference from lower caste leaders who are then 
projected as uncouth or backward.  
Overall, assertions of identity by the lower castes may enlarge their symbolic and ritual space within 
a village and provide armament to the build-up of a wider lower-caste political discourse. But, their 
impact on everyday livelihoods and better access to economic and social resources is limited by 
effective counter-resistance by the more powerful upper castes. And as we noted in section 5.1, 
according to widespread economic evidence, lower caste membership continues to be correlated 
with insecure livelihoods and lower living standards. 
Our second global/national context of local communities explores the integration of small farmers 
into global agricultural markets. The Indian national government has been pursuing policies that 
promote liberalization, beginning with the 1991 reforms which signalled India’s entry into the 
Washington consensus regime of globalization. In this regime, developing country states frame their 
national policies under neo-liberal prescriptions of the IMF, WTO and the World Bank.13 Trade in 
agriculture was also liberalized as part of this process and since the mid-1990s, global trends in crop 
prices are closely reflected in local markets. The volatility in global crop prices then sends uncertain 
signals regarding shifting of cropping patterns to farmers (Ghosh 2005). Following these signals, 
farmers may switch to an alternate crop only to find that the price has fallen by the time they bring 
                                                 
13 These policies have led to a gradual withdrawal of state support to ‘non-priority’ sectors such as agriculture, health and education, in 
order to achieve fiscal discipline at the macro-level. The brunt of these withdrawals is felt by the poor. Lobbying by, for example, the 
adversely affected farmers has been unable to effectively compete with the clout of industrial conglomerates in extracting more 
favourable resource allocation plans from the state in the last two decades. 
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the crop to market (Ghosh 2009 cites cotton and groundnut as two examples).14 In fact, these price 
fluctuations, coupled with declining public investment in agriculture (erosion of agricultural 
subsidies and extension services, reduction in resource allocation for irrigation and other agricultural 
infrastructure, reform of minimum support price and public procurement); rising farm-input costs;15 
lack of affordable credit; water scarcity and widespread failure of borewells are commonly reported 
as central causes of falling agricultural incomes and widespread rural indebtedness, which in turn are 
believed to have driven thousands of farmers to commit suicide (Posani 2009; Sainath 2009; Nagaraj 
2008; Mishra 2007a; 2007b; The Hindu 2007; Mishra 2006b; The New York Times 2006; Ghosh 
2005).16 This agrarian distress has gripped many Indian provinces, including the prosperous 
agricultural states of the Punjab and Harayana. And areas that produce export crops are the worst-
affected. During the post-liberalization 1990s, many provincial governments encouraged farmers to 
switch to export-oriented cash crops (Posani 2009). 
In a recent attempt to solve the agrarian crisis, after winning elections in 2004 on the promise of an 
agrarian revival and in the run-up to another national election, the United Progressive Alliance 
government at the centre announced a credit relief package of 600 billion rupees in the 2008-9 
budget. These waivers are however limited to formal loans and do not apply to farmers with more 
than 2 hectares of land. Thus the waivers exclude the majority of small and marginal farmers, who 
are dependent on informal credit from local moneylenders,17 and resource-poor farmers who own 
more than 2 hectares in dry areas (Chandrasekhar 2008).  
Another touted solution, the Agriculture Infrastructure and Investment Policy, announced in 2007 
by the government of the largest Indian province, Uttar Pradesh, was to provide “more freedom” to 
the farmer by eliminating middlemen (Ghosh 2007). According to this policy, farmers could directly 
sell their produce to a buyer at a mutually agreed upon price. The buyers can only be large firms that 
plan to invest 25 billion rupees over the next three years: the rational policy makers’ assumption 
being that large firms will be less exploitative of the small farmer than local moneylenders and farm-
input dealers. The policy also promotes contract farming where the firm may supply all farm-inputs 
                                                 
14 In a survey of price fluctuations in Warangal district of Andhra Pradesh, Venu Menon (2006, cited in Posani 2009) reported that 
price of cotton per 1000 kg swung between Rs. 2200 and Rs. 1450 within a 45-day period. The lowest price reached was Rs. 1200. 
15 Between 1992-2002, in Andhra Pradesh (AP), urea and DAP prices doubled, Murate of Potash prices quadrupled and so did prices 
of cotton and chilli seeds (Rao and Suri 2006, cited in Posani 2009). Up until 2004, Monsanto’s genetically modified, and patented, Bt 
cotton seeds cost four times as much as traditional hybrid varieties. Monsanto charged a high royalty on Bt seeds, more than six times 
the amount it charges in the United States (Mishra 2006a), manufactured by its partners in India. In AP, the prices were reduced under 
government pressure in 2005 but they are still more than twice that of other varieties (Sainath 2009). Ironically, working with the 
economic rule that free markets yield lower prices for the consumers, the same government had deregulated the farm-input markets in 
the 1990s and allowed TNC’s such as Monsanto and Syngenta to operate in India.  
16 Here too caste plays a role: the returns from cultivation are the lowest for the Dalits (in general, their landholdings are small or 
marginal). They are followed by the Scheduled Tribes (Mishra 2007b). Mishra also noted that only medium and large-sized farmers 
have consumption expenditures lower than their incomes. In other words, the small and marginal farmers get indebted just to meet 
their consumption needs. 
17 Smallholders without enough land to use as collateral find formal credit hard to come by and depend on informal credit from local 
moneylenders and farm-input dealers, whose interest rates range between 2 and 5% per month. The same farm-input dealers often 
double as middlemen between farmers and market, buying crop at lower than market price. Overall, the share of agricultural credit in 
total commercial bank lending declined from 18% in 1989 to about 10% in 2003 (GoI 2007). Since 2004-5, the availability of formal 
credit for agriculture has increased gradually but much of this credit still goes to seed companies, farm-input dealers and large farmers 
(Chandrasekhar 2008). 
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and expertise while the farmer provides land and labour. Contract farming is not new to India and 
has been offered as a route to prosperity for smallholders and mid-sized farmers in the past. 
However, results from the Punjab, where some experience with contract farming has accumulated 
over the last two decades, have shown that it has only benefited the relatively large farmers and that  
the terms of most contracts were unfavourable toward farmers (Singh 2002).18 Through stipulations 
in the contracts the firms shifted the production, and often market, risks to the farmers which 
automatically made contract-farming more feasible for richer farmers. Small farmers were simply 
excluded from contract farming by TNCs in the Punjab (Khairnar and Yelati 2005; Singh 2002). 
Finally, contract farming has simply reinforced environmental problems of post-green revolution 
agriculture such as soil degeneration due to repeated cultivation of the same crop season after 
season, and extensive use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers (higher quantities were used on 
contract farmed crops as compared to the other crops grown in the area, Singh 2002).  
In this section, we have used two cases from India to show how the global/national politico-
economic context manifests itself in everyday life of local communities. Paying adequate attention to 
this context is essential because it not only engenders changes in people’s identities, but also has a 
bearing on the practice of any community development effort by producing newer forms of 
vulnerabilities. Thus, any local development intervention is entangled, through material and 
ideological links, with global markets and information currents. The latter also shape any national 
policies or plans to uplift the poor by legitimating only those policies that are consistent with the 
reigning ideology of neo-liberalism, and by aligning the interests of local elites with non-local ones.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In a review of the literature on BoP, we have identified positive trends toward greater engagement 
with poor communities and other non-traditional stakeholders such as grassroots NGOs among 
main BoP proponents. However, the complexity of this participatory engagement is 
underappreciated in this literature and important issues about the poverty alleviation potential of 
BoP initiatives are not deeply explored. In particular, we have argued that an uncritical usage of the 
terms ‘community’, ‘participation’ and ‘co-creation’ negates the local and global politics of putting 
these ideas into practice.  
Reviewing literature on the politics of participation and intra-community heterogeneity in 
development studies, we have highlighted that local and non-local power relations; socially 
constructed routines of different stakeholders; and community embeddedness in global politico-
                                                 
18 In the Punjab, the contracts are considered too strict by the farmers, who are bound to meet their contractual obligations under all 
circumstances, while the firms are not obliged to stick to the contract under any (unforeseen) circumstances (Singh 2002: 1632-33). 
Farmers are not to be compensated in case of crop failure due to a natural calamity. A farmer is penalized if he’s unable to sell to the 
firm on time while it is not stipulated that the firm must buy the farmer’s produce. Singh also found that the contracts of domestic 
firms, written in the local language rather than in English, were much less stringent than those of the TNC subsidiaries. Despite the 
biased contracts, the large farmers exercised their agency in extracting profits out of contract farming and creating new employment 
opportunities for the poorer landless in the region. However, as Singh 2002: 1635 emphasizes these positive impacts are “unlikely to 
be sustained due to lack of trust between firms and farmers and the tendencies toward agribusiness normalization and monopolization 
by firms.” 
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economic contexts shape the practice of participatory and community-driven development projects. 
The nature of this practice then determines whose needs and local knowledge are considered 
legitimate within a community, and how these needs and knowledge are interpreted through more or 
less routinized practices of development workers. These ‘participatory’ processes are situated within 
structures of asymmetric power distribution between development experts and communities of the 
poor on the one hand, and global/national currents of corporate capital, commodities, information 
and ideologies on the other.  
The question then arises if development programmes, TNC-driven or otherwise, can be designed to 
ensure the inclusion of the marginalized in terms of equitable distribution of decision-making and 
project benefits. Or should we resign to the fact that a bulk of the benefits and empowerment 
possibilities from development programmes will flow to the relatively richer members in poor 
communities? After all, this latter outcome is still better than further wealth accumulation by a 
stockbroker on the Wall street in New York, or for that matter on Dalal street in Mumbai. However, 
in such a scenario, we may have to give up the ultimate dream of development – eradicating poverty 
in the global south (or become a naïve believer in one of the trickle down theories). The best chance 
to realise this dream, according to the evidence presented in this paper, is for development 
proponents to first understand and then gradually confront the local and not-so-local unequal power 
relations. Such a strategy raises the risk of getting embroiled in community conflicts but then this is 
what genuine embedding into a community, to ensure that no one is excluded, typically entails. 
Secondly, we must appreciate that the regime of neo-liberal globalization may not provide the right 
context in which such poverty reduction strategies can be effectively chased. Economic inequality, 
that sustains asymmetric power relations, has significantly worsened in developing countries such as 
China and India since they have integrated into this global regime of thin states and instrumental 
civil society organizations (CSOs, both for-profit and non-profit). Decentralized activities, such as 
participatory and community-driven development projects, can only succeed when they are 
complemented by strong states who play a complementary role to the CSOs in providing public 
goods such as infrastructure, social safety nets, and redistribution of resources through an effective 
system of taxation. The latter are not amenable to privatization.  
That said, it is plausible that the corporate-led globalization regime will undergo a sea change by 
sanctioning a greater role of the state in poorer regions of the world, simply because the TNCs 
themselves are now major stakeholders in the BoP poverty alleviation project. State subsidized 
TNC-driven BoP projects are not a distant reality and if questions about equal distribution of profits 
and democratic control of BoP projects are not adequately addressed, we might end up enriching the 
stockbroker yet again.  
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